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AbstrAct: The law of  armed conflict has often been described as 
outdated and ill suited to military conflicts in the twenty-first cen-
tury. Both academics and practitioners have argued that today’s wars 
tend to be asymmetric conflicts between states and nonstate actors, 
whereas the law of  armed conflict was made with a view to symmet-
rical interstate war. This article challenges that notion.
The law of  armed conflict—from the Lieber Code to the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions—was drafted precisely as a response to challenges posed by irregular fighters. The problems 
with applying the law to irregular warfare stem from two aspects: first, 
that the drafters of  the law repeatedly chose a negative approach to irreg-
ular fighters. They neither provided an explicit definition of  an irregular 
fighter nor did they spell out principles for their lawful treatment. The 
second aspect is that the aims of  western military interventions differ 
considerably from earlier forms of  anti-irregular fighting: in today’s anti-
irregular wars, political stabilization and societal reconciliation are the 
main political objectives. Thus, the central question facing both academ-
ics and practitioners is how the law of  armed conflict can be applied in a 
way that furthers these political aims.
The terror attacks of 9/11 and the military operations in their after-
math sparked a debate over the status and applicability of the law of 
armed conflict in the wars of the twenty-first century. Policymakers on 
both sides of the Atlantic were quick to assert that the law itself, most 
of which was drafted during the twentieth century, was inapplicable on 
the battlefields of the twenty-first century. The argument that the law of 
armed conflict was ill suited for the new paradigm of what would become 
known as the War on Terror was decisive for the Bush administration’s 
decision in February 2002 not to apply the Geneva Conventions to al 
Qaeda and Taliban fighters captured in Afghanistan.1 Although most 
Europeans like to think of themselves as having consistently opted for 
a rule-of-law approach to terrorism, senior officials in Europe echoed 
the argument.2
1     President’s Memorandum for the Vice President, the Secretary of  State, the Secretary of  
Defense, the Attorney General, Chief  of  Staff  to the President, Director of  Central Intelligence, 
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Chairman of  the Joint Chiefs of  Staff, 
“Humane Treatment of  al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees”’ (Washington, DC, 7 February 2002). The 
memorandum states: “By its terms, Geneva applies to conflicts involving ‘High Contracting Parties,’ 
which can only be states. Moreover, it assumes the existence of  ‘regular’ armed forces fighting on 
behalf  of  states. However, the war against terrorism ushers in a new paradigm, one in which groups 
with broad international reach commit horrific acts against innocent civilians, sometimes with the 
direct support of  states. Our nation recognizes that this new paradigm—ushered in not by us, but 
by terrorists—requires new thinking in the law of  war, but thinking that should be nevertheless 
consistent with the principles of  Geneva.”
2     John Reid, “Twenty-First Century Warfare —Twentieth Century Rules,” RUSI Journal 151, no. 
3 (2006): 14-17.
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The assumption on which this assessment is based is that the law of 
armed conflict was drafted with a view to symmetrical interstate wars, 
whereas wars in the twenty-first century will be asymmetric conflicts in 
which regular state forces are fighting against a variety of actors such 
as terrorists, rebels, insurgents, militias, mercenaries, pirates, and so on, 
who are usually lumped together under the notion of nonstate actors. 
Symmetry implies reciprocity, meaning all parties to a conflict will abide 
by the same rules. The concept of belligerent reprisals, which were a 
legitimate means of war until the drafting of the Geneva Conventions 
in 1949, reflects this assumption of reciprocity: if one party to a conflict 
systematically breaks the law of armed conflict, the opponent is entitled 
to retaliate in kind or in another punitive way to ensure the law is upheld.
In asymmetric conflicts—and it is important to note that the notion 
of asymmetric warfare predates the War on Terror and encompasses not 
only terrorism but also conflicts in the peripheries of the international 
system variously labeled new wars, low-intensity conflict, military opera-
tions other than war, or fourth generation warfare—reciprocity is by 
definition undermined.3 The concept of asymmetric warfare implies that 
a weaker opponent with fewer military capabilities and resources is pitted 
against a powerful state actor. Weak opponents will use almost any means 
at their disposal to achieve their aims in war; they will use terrorist tactics, 
attack civilians, plant roadside bombs, and kill prisoners if they happen to 
capture any.4 However, weak opponents, although not abiding by the law, 
will challenge any perceived transgression on the part of the state actor 
and exploit it in the court of international public opinion. They will even 
provoke such transgressions by using human shields around high-value 
targets. This vulnerability of the stronger side to allegations of violations 
of the law of armed conflict has been referred to as “lawfare.”5 Hence, 
in this perspective, championing the law means all sorts of pain, but no 
gain, for the stronger side in an asymmetric conflict.
The common conclusion to this type of analysis is that the law 
of armed conflict is outdated, that it needs to be either suspended or 
revised, and that we should not be surprised to see new moral and legal 
norms on the use of armed force arising and becoming institutionalized. 
The question rarely asked is whether the law was really drafted with a 
view to symmetrical interstate war—that regulative ideal that scholars, 
commentators and policymakers alike seem to grasp to understand the 
unruly and confusing battlefields of the twenty-first century.
From Lieber to Additional Protocol I
One of General Henry W. Halleck’s first acts as General-in-Chief 
of all the Union armies was to commission a legal memorandum from 
3     For a general overview on asymmetric warfare, see Rod Thornton, Asymmetric Warfare: Threat 
and Response in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge: Polity, 2007). On the alleged global transformation 
of  warfare more generally, Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2007); Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of  War (New York: Free 
Press, 1991). On fourth generation warfare, see T.X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 
Twenty-First Century (St Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2006). 
4     Michael L. Gross, Moral Dilemmas of  Modern War: Torture, Assassination and Blackmail in an Age 
of  Asymmetric Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). For a critique of  this narrow 
reading of  reciprocity, see Mark Osiel, The End of  Reciprocity: Terror, Torture and the Law of  War 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
5     See, for instance, Charles C. Dunlap, “Lawfare amid Warfare,” The Washington Times, August 
3, 2007.
Fighting irregular Fighters Scheipers        47
Francis Lieber on the problem of guerrilla warfare. Halleck, who had a 
background in law, was animated by the desire to prevail in the struggle 
with Confederate leadership over the legitimacy of the use of irregular 
fighters which had developed alongside the actual military confronta-
tion on the battlefields of the American Civil War. On 28 April 1862, 
the Confederate Congress adopted the Partisan Ranger Act, which 
stipulated the president could authorize bands of partisan rangers to 
operate against Union forces behind enemy lines. Halleck was adamant 
this was a breach of the customs of war and hoped Lieber would back 
him up with an authoritative legal opinion. However, the resulting text 
entitled Guerrilla Parties Considered with Reference to the Laws and Usages of 
War (1862) must have been a disappointment for Halleck. Lieber pro-
duced a remarkably detailed and nuanced legal assessment of irregular 
fighters, distinguishing among six different categories: freebooters; 
brigands; partisans and free corps; spies, rebels, and conspirators; war 
rebels; and the spontaneous rising en masse.6 Of these six categories of 
irregulars, only the partisans and free corps and the rising en masse, even 
without uniforms, were lawful belligerents in Lieber’s eyes. The guer-
rilla oscillated between the brigand, the partisan, and the rising en masse, 
which, according to Lieber, made it particularly difficult to determine 
his or her legal status.7
This was clearly not what Halleck had expected. For Halleck, even 
partisans, meaning regular units that operated independently from their 
command and, hence, the most regular of all irregular fighters were to 
be considered unlawful belligerents and shot, not to mention risings en 
masse or guerrillas. Halleck’s disappointment may have been the reason 
for his reluctance to support Lieber’s more ambitious project, which 
would become known as the Lieber Code.8 Lieber’s treatment of irregu-
lar fighters in the Code, written in 1863, is less nuanced. He retained 
the distinction between the lawful partisan and other unlawful types 
of irregular fighters, thus insisting on this difference of opinion with 
Halleck. However, he did not mention the rising en masse, nor did he 
discuss the problematic question of the legality of the guerrilla.9
Given Halleck’s opinion on the problem of irregular fighters, it is not 
surprising that much of Lieber’s writing on the issue was lost on Union 
commanders and troops in the field. However, there was a section in the 
Lieber Code that was much more closely followed by Union officers, and 
that was the section on “Insurrection—Civil War—Rebellion.” Lieber 
has often been credited with trying to codify protections for civilians 
in war.10 But that is only partly accurate. In fact, Lieber was rather 
ambivalent when it came to protecting civilians from the effects of war. 
He did not conceptualize the civilian as a protected group of persons 
as such; he used the term “unarmed citizens.” More importantly, the 
6     Richard Shelly Hartigan, Lieber’s Code and the Law of War (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, 1983), 
34-39.
7     Ibid., 40 
8     When Lieber wrote to Halleck in November 1862, suggesting a more comprehensive set of  
rules for the conduct of  the war, Halleck replied brusquely, “I have no time at present to consider the 
subject.” It was only due to Lieber’s perseverance the code was finally adopted; Mark Grimsley, The 
Hard Hand of  War: Union Military Policy towards Southern Civilians, 1861-1865 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 149.
9     Hartigan, Lieber’s Code, 60.
10     See, for instance, Theodor Meron,”‘Lieber’s Code and the Principles of  Humanity,” Columbia 
Journal of  Transnational Law 36, no. 22 (1997): 269-81.
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Lieber Code contained two contrasting approaches to the treatment of 
what we would call “civilians” today. On one hand, Lieber stated the 
“unarmed citizen is to be spared in person, property, and honor as much 
as the exigencies of war will admit.”11 On the other, in the section on 
“Insurrection—Civil War—Rebellion,” Lieber wrote:
The military commander of  the legitimate government, in a war of  rebel-
lion, distinguishes between the loyal citizen in the revolted portion of  the 
country and the disloyal citizen. The disloyal citizen may further be classified 
into those citizens known to sympathize with the rebellion without positively aiding it, 
and those who, without taking up arms, give positive aid and comfort to the rebellious 
enemy without being bodily forced thereto. . . .The commander will throw 
the burden of  war, as much as lies within his power, on the disloyal citizens, of  
the revolted portion or province, subjecting them to a stricter police than 
the non-combatant enemies have to suffer in regular war . . . he may expel, 
transfer, imprison, or fine the revolted citizens who refuse to pledge themselves 
anew as citizens obedient to the law and loyal to the government.12
Lieber’s legal approach to a war of rebellion made protections 
for civilians dependent on their behavior and even their political 
Weltanschauung. It effectively put all civilians in enemy territory under 
general suspicion. Hence, the Lieber Code “erected very few strong bar-
riers against severe treatment” of civilians.13 This approach was closely 
followed because Lieber had, in fact, taken his inspiration for this section 
from the prevailing practice in the field. The three-tier approach distin-
guishing between loyal, passively disloyal, and actively disloyal citizens 
had been developed in 1862 by local Union commanders in Missouri and 
had later been approved by Halleck himself.14 Lieber only mirrored what 
was already common practice in the field.
Soon after the end of the American Civil War, the question of how 
to deal with irregular fighters became pressing once again, though this 
time on the European side of the Atlantic. In 1870, the Prussian army 
had defeated the French forces and all but captured Paris when the 
French government, now under the leadership of the republican Leon 
Gambetta, made a last ditch attempt to stave off defeat. In October 
1870, Gambetta called his fellow citizens to resist the German occupa-
tion forces as francs-tireurs (literally “free shooters”) and to attack their 
lines of communication. The Prussian leadership was enraged. Despite 
the French government’s insistence that francs-tireurs were lawful bel-
ligerents, the Prussian headquarters issued an order according to which 
francs-tireurs were not to be treated as prisoners of war, but to be executed 
on capture. This order was later amended and the new decree stipulated 
ten years of forced labor rather than immediate executions. However, 
German forces treated most francs-tireurs as prisoners of war when 
captured. Yet, civilians had to endure harsh treatment by the German 
forces, in particular in those areas where francs-tireurs were active. Just as 
the Union forces in the American Civil War, the Germans chose a puni-
tive approach based on the assumption that it was ultimately the local 
population that was responsible for the francs-tireurs problem.
11     Ibid., 49.
12     Ibid., 71, emphasis added.
13     Grimsley, Hard Hand, 150.
14     For a more detailed account, see Sibylle Scheipers, Unlawful Combatants: A Genealogy of  the 
Irregular Fighter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2014), chapter 2.
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The defining feature of both the American Civil War and the 
Franco-Prussian War was that the opponents had divergent ideas of who 
was a lawful belligerent. It was no wonder, then, that contemporaries 
felt the need to clarify the laws of war and, in particular, the definition 
of irregular fighters. On the American side, the Lieber Code served that 
purpose, although Union commanders honored its provisions on irregu-
lar fighters more in the breach than in the observance. In Europe, the 
Franco-Prussian War sparked efforts to negotiate and codify the laws 
of war. Without doubt, it was the experience of the francs-tireurs problem 
that provided primary impetus. Negotiations in Europe were heavily 
influenced by the Lieber Code, which formed the basis of several draft 
proposals debated at the Brussels conference in 1874.
The conference failed to produce anything acceptable to all parties 
involved; hence, no law was adopted. The question of the lawfulness of 
irregular fighters had become so entangled with issues of military and 
political power as well as with ideological differences that no agreement 
was possible among the major European powers. However, the attempts 
at legal codification opened the definitional battlefield and clarified dif-
ferent positions within it. Political cleavage lines soon became clear: 
Germany and Russia, both of which possessed large regular armies, 
intended to keep the definition of lawful belligerency highly restrictive, 
hence not allowing for a defensive levée en masse or even militia forces. In 
contrast, smaller states that relied on militias for their national defense 
were opposed to this restrictive proposal. They were supported by 
Britain and France. The Brussels conference broke up after one month 
of negotiations, and no legal text was adopted. Only a declaration was 
issued. However, international lawyers were apparently not discouraged 
by this outcome. In 1880, the Oxford Institute of International Law 
published its own manual entitled The Laws of War on Land.
The Brussels declaration and the Oxford Manual were similar with 
respect to structure and content. Both texts were more inclusive than 
the Lieber Code regarding the question of the lawfulness of irregulars. 
Articles 9 and 10 of the Brussels declaration stipulated that regular 
armies, militia forces, volunteer corps, and a spontaneous rising en masse 
against invasion were lawful forms of national defense.15 
The fact that neither the Brussels declaration nor the Oxford 
Manual garnered widespread acceptance demonstrated that the question 
of the definition and treatment of irregular fighters was still undecided. 
Consensus on the definition of lawful belligerency was only reached in 
the 1907 Hague Convention on the Rules and Customs of War on Land. 
The Hague Convention retained the provisions on the lawfulness of the 
defensive rising en masse in nonoccupied territory, although it did not 
mention other military organizations included in the Oxford Manual, 
such as national guards, landsturm, and free corps.16
In sum, the history of the law of armed conflict from Lieber to the 
Hague Convention shows, first, that codification efforts were triggered 
by the experience of irregular fighting in the American Civil War and the 
15     “The Laws of  War on Land,” Institute of  International Law at Oxford, 9 September 1880, http://
www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/1880a.htm 
16     Annex to the Convention “Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of  War on Land,” 
Section I, Chapter I, Art 1-2, in Documents on the Laws of  War, ed. Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 73.
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Franco-Prussian War. Second, it demonstrates that the remits of lawful 
belligerency were contested between major political actors. Finally, it 
shows that, due to this contestation, the legal definition of the irregular 
was achieved ex negativo, and there were no provisions on the treatment of 
this category of persons. While Lieber had initially started with a detailed 
list of defined categories of irregular fighters, the Hague Convention 
defines only lawful belligerency. Hence, according to the Hague law, 
irregular fighters are all combatants who do not qualify as lawful belliger-
ents and who do not enjoy legal protections such as prisoner of war status.
While much nuance and detail was thus lost from Lieber’s initial 
texts on the issue of defining irregular fighters, the tendency to blame 
civilians for the activity of irregulars and to make them liable to punitive 
measures was carried forward to the early European texts. Both the 
Brussels declaration and the Oxford Manual stipulate that occupying 
powers can levy fines on the population.17 The Oxford Manual is more 
explicit when it comes to the protection of civilians—although it must 
be kept in mind that the legal texts at the time still neither used nor 
defined this category—and states, “It is forbidden to maltreat inoffensive 
populations.”18 At the same time, it makes clear that “The inhabitants of 
an occupied territory who do not submit to the orders of the occupant 
may be compelled to do so.”19 Hence, the upshot of the early attempts 
at codifying the laws of war is that the civilian population only warrants 
protection if it fully subjects itself to the occupying forces. This approach 
to the laws of war was as much about humanizing war and protecting 
local populations against wanton cruelty as it was about disciplining 
civilians. Its outlook on civilians was always potentially punitive, and 
the reason for this harsh posture was the civilians’ potential links with 
irregular fighters: they could aid them or take up arms themselves. So 
if the line between the regular and the irregular was unclear at the end 
of the nineteenth century, the boundaries between the irregular and the 
civilian were even more questionable. This tendency was carried forth 
in the Hague laws.20 The atrocities German forces, imbued with a fear 
of francs-tireurs that amounted to paranoia, committed in Belgium and 
northern France during the first months of World War I, were proof 
that the punitive approach had become even more significant in military 
operations on the ground. 21
Changes in the law would only come with the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, which provided more thorough protections for civilians in 
occupied territory. This was once again precipitated by a transformation 
in the perception of the irregular fighter. The Second World War is mostly 
remembered as a classical example of symmetric interstate war, but it had 
17     “Project of  an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of  War,” Art 
36-48, Brussels, 27 August 1874, http://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/135; “The Laws of  War,” Art 
43-60.
18     “The Laws of  War,” Art 7.
19     Ibid., Art 48.
20     Karma Nabulsi, “Evolving Conceptions of  Civilians and Belligerents: One Hundred Years 
after the Hague Peace Conferences,” Civilians in War, ed. Simon Chesterman (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 2001), 9-24. 
21     John Horne and Alan Kramer, German Atrocities, 1914: A History of  Denial (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 2002).
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large irregular aspects.22 While resistance groups fighting against Nazi 
occupation in Europe and Japanese occupation in Asia may not have 
had a decisive strategic impact, the experience of irregular resistance and 
appalling Axis countermeasures left an important legacy for the develop-
ment of the law of armed conflict after the war. It was difficult to uphold 
the image of the irregular fighter as the unlawful rebel given that the war 
had vindicated the moral cause of the resistance movements.
The uncomfortable truth was that the potentially punitive approach 
towards civilians in occupied territory embodied in the Hague law had 
done little to reign in the genocidal excesses of the German occupation 
forces on the eastern front and, to a lesser extent, in occupied western 
Europe. Of course, the Hague law had neither envisaged nor condoned 
the killing of millions of eastern European Jews, but the punitive per-
spective towards irregular fighters and their alleged civilian supporters 
had probably played a certain part in making the actions of the German 
occupation forces justifiable in the minds of some German officers 
and troops.23 Hence, it was logical to tackle the question of protections 
for civilians in occupied territory as one of the most pressing issues in 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The Fourth Geneva Convention, the 
Civilians Convention, accordingly represents the most important legal 
innovation achieved in Geneva. It demarcates the civilian as a separate 
category of persons entitled to specific protections in war and breaks 
with the potentially punitive approach to civilians by prohibiting civil-
ian reprisals, fines, and the taking of hostages.24 It also symbolically 
separates the civilian from his or her alleged links with irregular fighters.
At the same time, the Geneva Conventions made little progress with 
respect to the definition of and the provisions for irregular fighters. The 
articles on lawful belligerency are essentially taken from the Hague rules. 
Again, this decision boiled down to political considerations. The French 
delegation to the Geneva Conference, which included many former 
members of the resistance, had lobbied for the inclusion of provisions 
on conditions for lawful acts of resistance against occupying forces, but 
the United States and the United Kingdom delegations had no interest. 
In the end, France had to realize that it had switched sides: it was no 
longer occupied, but part of the Allied occupation forces in Germany.25
However, in one important respect, the Geneva Conventions did 
introduce new provisions for irregular fighters: Common Article 3 spells 
out minimum protections to apply in armed conflicts “not of an interna-
tional character.” These include the prohibition of torture and degrading 
treatment and the prohibition of executions “without previous judgment 
22     Jonathan E. Gumz even makes the case for reconceptualizing the Second World War “as a 
series of  unbounded insurgencies in that they were not solely confined to professional militaries 
alone, but rather involved various ideological and nationalized groups”; “Reframing the Historical 
Problematic of  Insurgency: How the Professional Military Literature Created a New History and 
Missed the Past,” Journal of  Strategic Studies 32, no. 4 (2009): 553-88.
23     However flimsy their statements in defense of  their actions might have been, some officers 
at the SS-Einsatzgruppen trial in Nuremberg argued that the executions they carried out had been 
lawful, as “those who were killed had been found guilty of  partisan warfare and robbery.” Hilary Earl, 
The Nuremberg SS-Einsatzgruppen Trial, 1945-1958: Atrocity, Law and History (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 144.
24     Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of  Civilian Persons in Time of  War of  
August12, 1949, Part I, Art 4, 13, 33 and 43, in Documents, ed. Roberts and Guelff, 302, 306, 312.
25     Karma Nabulsi, Traditions of  War: Occupation, Resistance, and the Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999), 14; Geoffrey Best, War and Law since 1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 118.
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pronounced by a regularly constituted court.”26 Not surprisingly, colo-
nial powers, foremost the United Kingdom, were alarmed by the broad 
remit of the article. At the time of the Geneva Conference, British 
forces were fighting a communist insurgency in Malaya and feared 
that Common Article 3 was “possibly restrictive to the operations.”27 
Both Britain and France attempted to tackle the problem of possible 
restrictions on military operations in the colonies that Common Article 
3 entailed by insisting the wars in Kenya and in Algeria, for instance, 
were domestic emergencies that did not amount to armed conflicts of a 
noninternational character.
Given these strong political interests, it is not surprising legal inno-
vations regarding irregular fighters were developed only after the major 
European powers lost their colonies. The rationale for the Additional 
Protocols (AP I and II) of 1977 once again arose from historical hindsight: 
the wars of decolonization had shown that irregular fighters sometimes 
do fight morally defensible wars, albeit with methods that are difficult 
to square with the requirements of lawful belligerency as spelled out in 
the Hague and Geneva laws. Yet their shortcomings may be excusable 
in the light of their situation: due to colonial oppression, many of them 
were unable to conform to the requirements for lawful belligerency, 
and punishing them would have perpetuated the oppressive regime 
they were fighting. The solution was to narrow the conditions for lawful 
belligerency by stipulating that lawful combatants are members of any 
armed forces, units, or groups commanded by a person responsible to a 
party to the armed conflict in question, “even if that Party is represented 
by a government or authority not recognized by an adverse Party.”28 As 
a procedural requirement, AP I stipulates that combatants have to carry 
their arms openly while engaged in an attack or in a military operation 
preparatory to an attack.29
In spite of this innovation, the law of armed conflict retained its 
negative approach to the problem of irregular fighters. AP I does lower 
the requirements for combatant privilege, and hence increases the 
variety of persons who qualify for prisoner of war status. At the same 
time, it fails to address the question of how to categorize persons who 
fail the privileged combatancy test, either because they violate the orga-
nizational or procedural requirements set out in Articles 43 and 44, or 
because they are civilians who take up arms against occupying forces. 
Various legal memos issued by subsequent US administrations, as well 
as academic discourse, have used the term “unlawful combatants” as a 
label for individuals who are neither privileged combatants nor “peace-
ful” civilians.30 Others have vehemently argued that the term unlawful 
combatants is not a category of the law of armed conflict.31 Even if we 
26     Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions, Documents, ed. Roberts and Guelff, 198.
27     Army Council Secretariat brief  for Secretary of  State for War, 1 December 1949, quoted 
in Hugh Bennett, Fighting the Mau Mau: The British Army and Counter-Insurgency in the Kenya Emergency 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 68.
28     Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of  12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of  Victims of  International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Section II, Art 43 (1), in 
Documents, ed. Roberts and Guelff, 444.
29     Ibid., Section II, Art 44 (3), in Documents, Roberts and Guelff, 444.
30     Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of  Hostilities under the Law of  International Armed Conflict 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 30ff.
31     International Committee of  the Red Cross, “Report on the Second Expert Meeting on the 
Notion of  Direct Participation in Hostilities,” The Hague, 25-26 October 2004, 17.
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leave aside the question of labels, the problem remains that there are very 
few legal provisions on the treatment of such persons.32 Moreover, major 
international actors such as the US and Israel have not ratified Additional 
Protocol I, and are hence only bound by those provisions on irregular 
fighters that have become customary international law (Articles 43 and 
75 in particular).
Twenty-First Century Conflicts
The history of the codification of the law of armed conflict shows 
that it was not exclusively drafted with a view to symmetrical interstate 
war. On the contrary, it was the experience of problems posed by irregu-
lar fighters which propelled the law step by step from its early stages 
to the Additional Protocols of 1977. One important flaw of the law of 
armed conflict was corrected along the way: the idea that civilians were 
liable for punishment if irregular fighters had operated in their territory. 
Another major shortcoming is its negative approach to the definition of 
irregular fighters and its lack of provisions for this status, which contin-
ued through the different codification stages.
So those scholars and legal practitioners who argue the United 
States (and other nations) did not have much to go on in terms of the 
law regarding the question of how they should treat al Qaeda suspects 
and other irregular fighters in recent operations were not entirely wrong, 
though the reason for this was not that the law is outdated.33 Rather, it is 
related to the fact that major international actors in successive rounds of 
the law's codification had no interest in spelling out a detailed definition 
of unlawful belligerency and in stipulating provisions for the treatment 
of persons who would fall into this category. The law's exclusionary 
approach towards irregular fighters made it all too easy to marginalize 
them simply because they were perceived as an anomaly for which the 
law did not provide.
This perspective has given the debate on irregular fighters an unfor-
tunate twist in that it has prevented the most relevant question from 
being asked: how should the West treat irregular fighters to further its 
strategic aims in military operations? Instead, it has led to legal(istic) 
extremes. Two extreme positions on a spectrum of different opinions 
on the legal treatment of irregular fighters emerged. Both share the view 
that the law is outdated, but come to opposite conclusions on the way 
forward. At one end of the spectrum are those who aim to create more 
explicit rules and add new restrictions; on the other end are those who 
argue the law of armed conflict does not apply to irregular fighters and 
they are, hence, without any legal rights or protections. Both positions 
are fraught with difficulties.
Regarding the first position, it is an oft-repeated observation among 
critical international lawyers, commentators, and activists that the 
32     Article 45 of  the Additional Protocol stipulates that those who are denied prisoner of  war 
status for failing to meet the requirements of  lawful belligerency are entitled to a review of  their 
status “before a judicial tribunal.” Even if  they are not granted prisoner of  war status, they must be 
treated in accordance with Common Article 3 and Article 75 AP I, which is regarded as customary 
international law; all printed in Documents, Roberts and Guelff,446, 198, 463.
33     See, for instance, Benjamin Wittes, Law and the Long War: The Future of  Justice in the Age of  
Terror (New York: Penguin, 2008); John B. Bellinger III, “Legal Issues Related to Armed Conflict 
with Non-state Groups,” in Prisoners in War, ed. Sibylle Scheipers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010), 251-62.
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West’s approach to irregular fighters in the War on Terror, and in par-
ticular to their detention and interrogation, has been characterized by 
the creation of legal “black holes, vacuums” and the exploitation of legal 
“loopholes.”34 The call for more law seemed to be a logical conclusion. 
However, it is not entirely correct that the most disastrous aspects of 
the treatment of irregular fighters in recent conflicts stemmed from the 
absence of law or legal reasoning. On the contrary, the numerous legal 
memos on irregular fighters issued since 2001 were written by lawyers 
and used legal arguments and concepts.35 Against this background, it 
is hard to see how the default option of more law should have pro-
vided viable safeguards and solutions. Moreover, the fact that there is 
a range of concepts and ideas on how the law of armed conflict should 
be updated to regulate the treatment of irregular fighters suggests that 
arriving at a new internationally binding consensus would be difficult 
and time-consuming. Limited attempts at formulating preliminary rules 
such as the Copenhagen Process on the Handling of Detainees, in which the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its member states, 
the United Nations, and the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) are involved, are under way.36 While these preliminary debates 
are laudable and useful, even such limited attempts will take time to 
produce results that could be taken as firm guidance in operations on 
the ground.
On the other end of the spectrum are those who assume that the law 
of armed conflict does not apply. However, as discussed above, Common 
Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and Article 75 AP I, offer minimum 
protections for all categories of persons in armed conflict, hence also for 
irregular fighters. These sources comprise prohibitions against murder, 
torture, and inhumane and degrading treatment; of enforced prostitu-
tion; of the taking of hostages; of collective punishments; and of threats 
of any of those acts. Furthermore, they spell out some basic procedural 
rules for prosecuting individuals for penal offences.37 They do allow 
for the detention or internment of individuals who may pose a threat 
to the security of states involved in an armed conflict. What they do 
not clarify is first, what kind of evidence such detention has to be based 
and, second, what the criteria and procedures for continued detention 
or, alternatively, release are.38
34     To a certain extent, this charge is also leveled against the practice of  targeted killing. Although 
the legal discourse on targeted killing is related to the issues discussed here, I cannot cover it in this 
context for reasons of  space limitations. For a useful legal starting point, see Nils Melzer, Targeted 
Killing in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
35     Most of  the memos issued by the Bush administration in the years 2002-04 were collected 
and published in Karen J. Greenberg, Joshua L. Dratel, and Anthony Lewis, eds., The Torture Papers: 
The Road to Abu Ghraib (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Later memos by US 
administrations as well as legal memos by other NATO states that are relevant for the treatment of  
irregular fighters remain classified. 
36     “Copenhagen Process on the Handling of  Detainees in International Military Operations,” 
Udenrigsministeriet Ministry of  Foreign Affairs of  Denmark, http://um.dk/en/politics-and-diplomacy/
copenhagen-process-on-the-handling-of-detainees-in-international-military-operations/; on the de-
bate on new legal rules on detention, see also Adam Roberts, “Detainees: Misfits in Peace and War,” 
in Prisoners in War, ed. Sibylle Scheipers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 276f.
37     In addition, some parts of  international human rights law may apply as well in specific 
situations. However, human rights protections would probably not go substantially beyond the 
principles spelled out in article 75 AP I, although specific principles such as the non-refoulement 
rule (covering the prohibition of  transferring detainees to a state that may torture them) would have 
an effect on operations.
38     Roberts, “Detainees,” 270.
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In the absence of new legal rules, political and strategic solutions to 
these issues need to be found. The basic challenge is to gear the treatment of 
irregular fighters in theaters comparable to Afghanistan and Iraq towards 
the aim of political stabilization and societal reconciliation. Asymmetric 
conflicts and the dilemmas related to the treatment of irregular fight-
ers are not new. What is new, however, is the emphasis on sustainable 
pacification—stabilization is the current buzzword—as the ultimate 
goal in these wars. Against this background, it is questionable whether 
a purely exclusionary approach is the way forward. Political stabilization 
requires societal reconciliation and the reintegration of irregular fighters 
into the social and political system of the target state in question. The 
negotiations with Taliban leaders, which started in June 2013 in Qatar, 
bear witness to the West’s (belated) acknowledgment of reconciliation 
and reintegration as a vital component of long-term stabilization.
This perspective applies in particular to those individuals whose 
allegiance is first to the local insurgency, that is, fighters who are not 
involved in global terrorist operations. The question of their treatment 
is most usefully discussed from the perspective of war’s end: how ought 
fighters be treated to enable their successful reintegration into society at 
the end of the war? How will their treatment during the conflict impact 
on the chances of post-conflict reconciliation and hence the achieve-
ment of a lasting peace?39 Supposedly more enlightened commentators, 
in particular on the European side of the Atlantic, often suggest that 
treating them as criminals rather than gratifying them with combatant 
status is the way forward when it comes to treatment of irregular fight-
ers. However, there are indications from historical cases, in particular 
the United Kingdom’s experience with the Irish Republican Army in 
the 1970s and 1980s, that acknowledging some kind of combatant status 
of detained irregular fighters and local terrorists can open the road to 
long-term political solutions.40 On the other hand, criminal prosecutions 
would be the preferable solution for those who have been suspected of 
involvement in the planning or implementation of terrorist attacks of a 
global nature. The fact these prosecutions have failed seems to have little 
to do with principle obstacles. Rather, the two greatest inhibiting factors 
were, first, that the military commissions initially charged with putting 
this group of individuals on trial were based on rules and procedures 
that were so flawed they proved almost impossible to correct. Secondly, 
parts of the evidence to be used against these suspects was based on 
torture and hence inadmissible in any lawful trial.41 These complications 
could have been avoided had the minimum protections stipulated in 
Article 75 AP I been implemented.
39     For a more detailed discussion of  this issue, see Sibylle Scheipers, “Conclusion: Prisoners and 
Detainees in Current and Future Military Operations,” in Prisoners in War, 313-20.
40     While the Thatcher government never officially accepted the IRA’s claim that imprisoned 
IRA fighters were POWs, it did tacitly concede to most of  the IRA hunger strikers’ demands, which 
principally aimed at removing the stigma of  criminalization from IRA prisoners. These concessions 
occurred at a time when the IRA’s engagement with the political system increased. The treatment of  
IRA prisoners had at the very least a stabilizing effect on the IRA’s nonviolent political engagement. 
See also Richard English, Armed Struggle: The History of  the IRA (London: Macmillan, 2003), chapters 
5 and 6.
41     Roberts, “Detainees,” 272.
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Conclusion
The law of armed conflict is a peculiar field of law as it refuses 
to regulate a phenomenon that repeatedly provided the main impetus 
for its progressive codification: irregular fighters. Rather than providing 
definitions and rules on the treatment of irregular fighters, successive 
generations of lawmakers chose a negative approach to the phenom-
enon: the irregular is he (or she) who does not qualify for privileged 
combatancy and the attendant privileges and protections. This pecu-
liarity of the law gave rise to claims that the established legal rules as 
laid down in the Hague and the Geneva conventions are outdated and 
inapplicable to wars in twenty-first century.
However, what these claims overlook is that the law was influenced 
by considerations of political power and military expediency at all stages 
of its codification. Halleck rejected Lieber’s ideas on the treatment of 
irregular fighters, as he found them too lenient and feared their implemen-
tation might endanger Union victory in the American Civil War. Neither 
Germany nor Russia had an interest in considering small state militias as 
lawful belligerents. And while the Allies after World War II perceived 
it as both ethical and useful to enhance protections for civilians in war, 
France and Britain, in particular, were wary of codifying the law in such a 
way that it might endanger their colonial authority. In all these instances, 
powerful states had a strong interest in excluding irregular fighters from 
the remits of the law of armed conflict.
International law, including the law of armed conflict, is mainly 
made by states, and it is neither surprising nor entirely reprehensible that 
it bears the mark of state interest. What is important, however, is to be 
aware of the fact that at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the 
outright exclusion of irregular fighters may not be in the West’s strategic 
interest. As we have seen, asymmetric conflicts are not new. Irregular 
fighters have existed at all times in the history of war. What is new, 
however, are the West’s strategic and political aims of stabilization in 
conflicts against irregular fighters. In the twenty-first century, western 
states are facing the challenge of bringing the law of armed conflict in 
line with the strategic aim of stabilization or, rather, to apply it in a way 
that does not undermine this aim.
